Between Facts and Norms: An Author\u27s Reflections by Habermas, Jurgen
Denver Law Review 
Volume 76 
Issue 4 Fifth Annual Legal Theory Symposium - 
Exploring Habermas on Law and Democracy 
Article 5 
January 2021 
Between Facts and Norms: An Author's Reflections 
Jurgen Habermas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author's Reflections, 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. 937 (1999). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: AN AUTHOR'S REFLECTIONS
JORGEN HABERMAS
What an author has actually said in and with a book, is up to inter-
pretation. An intelligent reader will almost always know better than the
author himself. The author only knows what he intended to say. With
Droit et Democratie I think I have made specific contributions to six
topics:
I. The form and function of modem law;
II. The relation between law and morality;
III. The relation between human rights and popular sovereignty;
IV. The epistemic function of democracy;
V. The central role of public communication in mass-
democracy;
VI. The debate about competing paradigms of law.
I. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF MODERN LAW
The first topic-form and function of modem law-issues from a
sociological controversy about the function of modem law. The question
is whether modem law is just a means for the exercise of administrative
or political power or whether law still functions as a medium of social
integration. In this regard I side with Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parson
against Max Weber: Today legal norms are what is left from a crumbled
cement of society; if all other mechanisms of social integration are ex-
hausted, law yet provides some means for keeping together complex and
centrifugal societies that otherwise would fall into pieces. Law stands in
as a substitute for the failures of other integrative mechanisms-markets
and administrations, or values, norms, and face-to-face communications.
This integrative capacity can be explained by the fact that legal norms
are particularly functional in virtue of an interesting combination of for-
mal properties: Modem law is cashed out in terms of subjective rights; it
is enacted or positive as well as enforced or coercive law; and though
modem law requires from its addressees nothing more than norm-
conformative behavior, it must nevertheless meet the expectation of le-
gitimacy so that it is at least open to the people to follow norms, if they
like, out of respect for the law. It is easy to see why this legal form fits
the requirements of modem societies:
Modem law is supposed to grant an equal distribution of subjective rights
for everybody. Such liberties function as a protective belt for each per-
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son's pursuit of her own preferences and value-orientations and thereby
fits the pattern of decentralized decision-making (which is in particular
required for market-societies).
Modern law is enacted by a political legislator and confers with its form a
binding authority to flexible programs and their implementation. It thus
fits the particular mode of operation of the modern administrative state.
Modem law is enforced by the threat of state sanctions and grants, in the
sense of an average compliance, the "legality" of behavior. It thus fits the
situation of pluralist societies where legal norms are no longer embedded
in an encompassing ethos shared by the population as a whole.
Modern law grants, however, stability of behavioral expectations only on
the condition that people can accept enacted and enforceable norms at the
same time as legitimate norms that deserve intersubjective recognition.
Law thus fits to a posttraditional moral consciousness of citizens who are
no longer disposed to follow commands, except for good reasons.
II. THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY
The second topic--the relation between law and morality-issues
from the controversy between legal positivism and natural rights theories
about the question, how to explain the specific validity of law. Both po-
sitions face well-known and complementary difficulties. To put it in a
nutshell: positivists, on one side, conceive legal norms as binding expres-
sions of the superior will of political authorities. Like legal realists, who
treat legal norms just as the result of policy-decisions, positivists cannot
explain how legitimacy can spring from sheer legality. Both positivists
and realists (including proponents of the CLS movement) refuse to rec-
ognize any claim to legitimacy stronger than the kind of legal validity
that terminates in formally correct enactment and efficient enforcement.
Proponents of natural right theories, on the other side, derive the legiti-
macy of positive law immediately from a higher moral law. Positive law
here figures as the lowest level in a hierarchy of laws, the top of which is
occupied by natural law, which is explained in metaphysical or religious
terms. Even if we leave problems of foundationalism aside, such an as-
similation of law to morality blurs important differences between the
two. Whereas moral norms primarily tell us, what we ought to do and
what we owe each other, modem law is in the first place designed for the
distribution of individual liberties-for the determination of private
spheres where everybody is free to do what one wants to do. Moral
rights, on the other hand, are derivative from other people's duties to-
wards us, whereas in law, rights are duties, since legal duties only result
from mutual constraints of equally granted liberties.
The complementary weaknesses of both positions leads us to the
conclusion that legitimacy of law must not be assimilated to moral valid-
ity, nor should law be completely separated from morality. Law is best
understood as a functional complement of a weak posttraditional moral-
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ity, which is, beyond institutionalization, only rooted in the conscience of
the individual person. From an observer's point of view, modem law can
therefore compensate for the uncertainties of moral conscience that usu-
ally works well only in the context of face-to-face contacts; where as
coercive law has an impact far beyond that. At the same time, positive
law does not lose all moral content, at least not as long as it meets the
legitimacy requirement.
III. THE RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY
The third topic-the relation between human rights and popular sov-
ereignty-issues from a longstanding controversy about the source of
legitimacy. Because of the positivity of law, we must distinguish here the
role of authors who make (and adjudicate) law, from that of addresses
who are subjects of established law. The autonomy of the person, which
in the moral domain is all of one piece, so to speak, appears in the legal
domain only in the dual form of private and public autonomy. These two
elements-the liberties of the subject of private law and the political
autonomy of citizens-must be mediated in such a way that the one form
of autonomy is not impeded by the other one. This is to say that legal
persons can be autonomous only insofar as they can understand them-
selves, in the exercise of their civic rights, as authors of just those norms,
which they are supposed to obey as addressees. However, this intuition
has never been quite convincingly explicated in Political Theory.
The republican tradition, which goes back to Aristotle and the politi-
cal humanism of the Renaissance, has always given the public autonomy
of citizens' priority over the prepolitical liberties of private persons. Lib-
eralism, on the other hand, has always invoked the danger of tyrannical
majorities and postulated the priority of the rule of law, as guaranteed by
negative freedoms. Human rights were supposed to provide legitimate
barriers that prevented the sovereign will of the people from encroaching
on inviolable sphere of individual freedom. But both views are one-
sided. The rule of law, expressed in the idea of human rights, must nei-
ther be merely imposed on the sovereign legislator as an external barrier,
nor be instrumentalized as a functional requisite for the democratic proc-
ess. In order to articulate this intuition properly, it helps to view the
democratic process from the standpoint of discourse theory.
At this point I cannot summarize the complex arguments for the in-
terdependence of both, human rights and popular sovereignty. Let me
only make two remarks. The first suggestion is to conceive human rights
as what is necessary for the legal institutionalization of the democratic
process of self-legislation. That is, however, prima facie plausible only
for those civil rights-the rights of communication and participation-
that empower citizens to exercise their political autonomy. The
suggestion is less plausible for the classical human rights that guarantee
citizens' private autonomy. So it is further suggested to analyze the very
grammar of the legal language which citizens must speak when they
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of the legal language which citizens must speak when they wish to act as
citizens. In other words, the legal code as such must be available as soon
as we would wish to legally institutionalize a democratic process. We
know from the analysis of the legal form, however, that we cannot estab-
lish any kind of legal order without creating placeholders for legal per-
sons who are bearers of individual rights-whichever right these may be.
But providing subjective rights means per se to provide a guarantee for
private autonomy. This then is the core of the argument: Without basic
rights that secure the private autonomy of citizens, there also would not
be any medium for the legal institutionalization of the conditions under
which these citizens could make use of their public autonomy. Thus pri-
vate and public autonomy mutually presuppose each other in such a way
that neither human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy
over its counterpart.
IV. THE EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF DEMOCRACY
The fourth topic-the epistemic function of democracy - issues from
the question why we may expect the legitimacy of law to emerge from
the democratic process at all. The discourse-approach explains the le-
gitimacy-generating force of the process with a democratic procedure
that grounds a presumption of the rational acceptability of outcomes.
Norms owe their legitimacy to a kind of recognition that is based on ra-
tionally motivated agreement. This assumption is stated in terms of the
discourse principle: "Only those norms are valid to which all persons
possibly affected could agree as participants in rational discourses." The
contractarian tradition up to Rousseau and Kant has also referred to "rea-
son" as a post-metaphysical base for legal and political orders. This
mentalist conception of reason is now translated, however, in pragmatist
terms and spelled out in terms of practices of reason-giving, i.e. as con-
ditions for deliberation. Rational discourse is supposed to be public and
inclusive, to grant equal communication rights for participants, to require
sincerity and to diffuse any kind of force other than the forceless force of
the better argument. This communicative structure is expected to create a
deliberative space for the mobilization of the best available contributions
for the most relevant topics.
"Deliberation" is broadly understood here and covers a wide range of
reasons. Depending on empirical, technical, prudential, ethical, moral or
legal reasons we distinguish different types of rational discourse and
corresponding forms of communication. The rational acceptability of
legal norms does not depend only, and not even primarily on moral con-
siderations but on other kinds of reasoning as well, including processes
of fair bargaining. Compromises form, after all, the core of politics.
Anyway, this encompassing notion of 'deliberation' is to pave the way
for a process-conception of legitimation. Legitimation depends on an
appropriate legal institutionalization of those forms of rational discourse
and fair bargaining that ground the presumption of the rational accept-
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ability of outcomes. Deliberative politics is thus wedded to a complex
notion of procedural legitimacy. There are three different kinds of proce-
dures intertwined in the democratic process: first, the purely cognitive
procedures of (various forms of) deliberation; secondly, decision proce-
dures that link decisions to preceding deliberations (in normal cases the
majority rule); finally, legal procedures which specify and regulate in a
binding manner the material, social and temporal aspects of opinion- and
will-formation processes.
V. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION IN MASS-
DEMOCRACY
The fifth topic-the central role of public communication-is an ob-
vious implication of the discourse-approach. From a normative point of
view, structural features of political communication are more important
than individual properties, such as the capacity for rational choice or good
intentions or appropriate motivations. Public communication must be inclu-
sive and selective at the same time; it must be channeled in such a way, that
relevant topics come up, interesting contributions and reliable information
come in, and good arguments or fair compromises decide on what comes
out. This view is sufficiently abstract to bridge the gap between the nor-
mative idea of self-legislation and the stubborn facts of complex societies.
In virtue of the discourse-approach we can now disconnect the idea
of popular sovereignty from its traditional bearer, "the people", which is
a notion too concrete for present circumstances. On the normative level,
another conception takes the place of the 'sovereignty of the people': the
communicative freedom of citizens, which is supposed to issue in a pub-
lic use of reason. Collective actors of civil society who are sufficiently
sensitive and inclusive, can bother be instrumental for the perception
problems of society-wide relevance, translate them into public issues and
thus generate, through various networks, the "influence" of public opin-
ions. Bust such "influence" is transformed into "power" only by an inter-
action of the informal and diffuse communications flows of the public
sphere at large with formally organized opinion- and will-formation pro-
cesses first embodied in the parliamentary and the judiciary complex.
"Communicative power" is produced according to the democratic proce-
dures of elected and deliberating bodies and the, in accordance with leg-
islative programs and court decisions, transformed into the "administra-
tive power" of the executive agencies, available for the purpose of im-
plementation. This is, of course, only the normatively prescribed image
from which the real circuit of power widely deviates. But it is an image
that allows us at least to connect the normative self-understanding or
constitutional democracy with its real practices.
VI. THE DEBATE ABOUT COMPETING PARADIGMS OF LAW
The last topic-the introduction of a new, proceduralist paradigm of
law-issues from the hopeless competition between the two received
1999]
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legal paradigms, the liberal and the welfare-state paradigm. The liberal
paradigm counts on an economic society that is institutionalized through
private law, above all through property rights and contractual freedom,
and thus left to the spontaneous workings of the market. If, however, the
legal capacity of private persons to own, acquire or sell property is sup-
posed to guarantee social justice, then everybody must enjoy equal op-
portunities for making effective use of equally distributed legal powers.
Since capitalist societies generally do not meet this requirement, propo-
nents of the welfare-state paradigm argue for compensating growing
inequalities in economic power, property, income and living conditions.
Private law must be substantially specified and social rights must be re-
introduced. On the other hand, unintended effects of welfare-paternalism
indicate limitations of this alternative, too. It turns out that the traditional
debate on deregulated markets versus state regulations is too narrowly
focused on private autonomy, while the internal relation between private
and public autonomy drops out of the picture. Between the two received
paradigms, the only controversial issue is whether private autonomy is
best guaranteed straightaway be negative freedoms, or whether the con-
ditions for private autonomy must be secured through the provision of
welfare entitlements.
One way out of this impasse is indicated by a third, a proceduralist
paradigm that crystallizes neither around the private competitor on mar-
kets nor around the private client of welfare bureaucracies, but has its
focus on the citizen who participates in political opinion- and will-
formation. For private legal subjects cannot enjoy equal liberties if they
themselves do not in advance exercise their civic autonomy in common
in order to specify, which interests are at stake and which standards of
evaluation are justified in the light of which cases should be treated alike
and different cases differently. Citizens can only arrive at fair regulations
for their private status if they make an appropriate use of their political
rights in the public domain. They must be willing to participate in the
*struggle over the public relevance, the interpretation and evaluation of
their own needs, before legislators and judges can even know what it in
each case means to treat like cases alike. In highly differentiated societies
with an intransparent diversity of interests, it is an epistemic requirement
for the equal distribution of liberties for everybody that those citizens
affected and concerned first get themselves the chance to push their cases
in the public, and articulate as justify those aspects which are relevant for
equal treatment in typical situations. Briefly, the private autonomy of
equally entitled citizens can be secured only insofar as citizens actively
exercise their civic autonomy.
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